

## Correlation between Third Positionism and the Iqbal's Concept of Nationalism: A Case Study of Sectarian Demography and Interfaith Harmony in Gilgit-Baltistan

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This study has no aim to affect the ideology of any segment within any state or any society but is based on primary and secondary sources of data.

### Abstract

Third Positionists believe that an ethnic community in any region has the right to get political and economic control over the resources under the territory where it stays. Broader concepts of German and Italian nationalisms (on the bases of socio-cultural, traditional, phonetical and biological identities) usually denote Nazism and Fascism respectively are considered as the early implicated examples of this school. Likewise, the formation of Pakistan as per Iqbal's concept of religion-based nationalism is also counted as an implication of Third Positionism where Iqbal replaced broader German or Italian identity with 'Islam' and 'Muslim nationhood' and dreamed to get a separate homeland for British Indian Muslims where they would have to practice their Islamic-disciplined national life. This study presents Third Positionists' viewpoint about Iqbal's religion-based nationalism and analyzes its expected implication in Gilgit-Baltistan during the 21<sup>st</sup> century where some banned militant organizations not only consider Ismaili-Shia community as a non-Muslim or 'Kafir', but try to trigger ethno-sectarian conflicts with Ismaili populated areas. In this context, this study also investigated socio-political and economic developments under different agencies of the Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Pakistan, machinations for the Agha Khan State, and the predicted negative impacts of ethno-sectarian conflicts in Gilgit-Baltistan on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

## Introduction

Iqbal is considered the ideological founder of Pakistan but the majority of Asian and Eastern scholars examine Iqbal's concept of religion-based nationalism as an Asian or Eastern product (Jawed, 1996, P.160; Esposito, 1998, P.95). On the other hand, Third Positionists or 'Third Position School of Political Economy' does not find any difference between early Third Positionists' viewpoints and Iqbal's concept of religion-based nationalism (Liam, 2017). According to them<sup>1</sup>, Iqbal's revised version of nationalism after his visit to Europe was actually the mixing of Nazi and Fascist traits with spiritual dimensions of Islam (Esposito, 1998, P.95). In other words, they argue that Iqbal replaced the German and Italian broader socio-cultural, lingual and biologically inherited concept of nationalist identity with broader religious identity (sometimes called Pan-Islamism) (Liam, 2017). Similarly, described socio-political and economic disciplines for the nationals within their territorial jurisdictions by either Hitler or Mussolini (in Germany and Italy respectively) coerced Iqbal to present an idea of a separate homeland for British Indian Muslims where they would have to practice their Islamic-disciplined national life (Jawed, 1996, P.160; Esposito, 1998, P.95).

Therefore, third Positionists believe that the formation of Pakistan is the fulfillment of an idea of Iqbal extracted from Nazism and Fascism within the Third Position School of Political Economy. However, 21<sup>st</sup>-century alarms the revision of Iqbal's respective ideology at the route of CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan where some banned militant organizations consider Ismaili-Shia Muslims as non-Muslims or non-believers (*kafir*) (Mines, 2010, P.265; Turner, 2010, P.197). This is the fact that sectarian violence against any peaceful community leads to religion-based ethno-national separatism in any state/region. The same is the case with Gilgit-Baltistan where sectarian violence against the Ismaili community has become the cause of machinations for "Agha Khan State" (Mines, 2010, P.265; Turner, 2010, P.197). Therefore, by investigating the 'history of emerging Third Position School' and then Iqbal's move towards religion-based nationalism, the study evaluates how ethno-sectarian conflicts are becoming the cause of revising Iqbal's concept of nationalism with the new shape at the CPEC route in Gilgit-Baltistan.

## Third Position School

Third Positionists' view or Third Position School of Political Economy seems to be close to the Mixed School of Political Economy but the difference is, it finds the political ideas in between the reactionary right-wing cultural views and radical left-wing economic views (Griffin, 1995, P.19)., Third Positionists like Chip Berlet (1990), Roger Griffin (1995) and Kevin Coogan (1999) often try to achieve the goal of separation or segregation regarding the preservation of their cultural differences and protection of domestic economy on the base of ethnicity and race (Coogan, 1999, PP.81-83). Therefore, they support ethno-national separatism and ethno-national movements in developing countries. The term "Third Position" was firstly introduced in Europe during the early 20<sup>th</sup>-century while, its initial example was National Bolshevism and Nazism as quoted by its supporters (Griffin, 1995, P.19). While, these examples were rejected by Roger Griffen. He argued, "Third Positionism is nor beyond right neither beyond left but a synthesis of palingenesis<sup>2</sup> and nationalism (called palingenetic ultranationalism) with having either anarchist,

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Liam, Alexis Emile and Bilal Nadeem.

<sup>2</sup> It is a philosophical, theological, political and biological concept about re-birth or re-creation.

corporative, distributive or socialist traits” (Griffin, 1995, P.19). On the other hand, Martin A. Lee illustrated that Fascism itself got birth from the Hitler’s Nazism while both ideologies were the reaction of Post-W.W.I global political structure (Lee, 1999, P.41). Martin further elaborated that both ideologies; Nazism and Fascism were based upon pan-Germanism and pan-Italianism. Benito Mussolini adopted almost similar patterns in Italy that Adolf Hitler had in Germany. As Hitler’s three basic slogans for promoting Nazism were; “we are the Germans”, “we are the superior”, and, “we have to take revenge”, Mussolini constructed his ideological building on the basis of Italian ethnicity under Italian territorial jurisdiction (Lee, 1999, P.41). According to Martin A. Lee, both regimes were seeking a complete authoritative socio-political and economic control over the resources on the base of cultural or racial ethnicity under their territorial jurisdiction (Lee, 1999, P.41).

However, Robert J. Antonio discussed Third Positionism as a Post-Modern phenomenon (Antonio, 2000, PP.40-87). According to him, to demand socio-political and economic control over the resources based on ethnicity or race can also be called reactionary tribalism where the reaction of any tribe against state-centric elements is constructed or triggered by tribal leaders or any third party (for example, proxy agents of private war economies) (Antonio, 2000, PP.40-87).

Some other modern Third Positionists are Paul Collier, Roberto Fiore and Gabriele Adinolfi while, David Keen is also considered to be the closest member of the Third Positionists’ family because he discussed the theories of “Greed versus Grievances” and “Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars” (Covey, 2011, P.08; Cuperus, 2001, P.115)

During the civil wars of 1958 and 1975 in Lebanon, the Phalangist movement by the Lebanese Phalanges Party is described as the best example of Third Positionism. Lebanese Phalanges Party was a secular Christian democratic political party that introduced the Lebanese version of the third position. Participants and supporters of this movement fortified native Lebanese blood and soil from a substantial demographic change through Arab Islamic settlement. The major focus of this movement was to achieve a radical collective economy with extreme cultural conservatism. Similarly, American Third Position Party<sup>3</sup> was established in the United States in 2010, it’s basic aim was to channel the disappointment of right-wing populists<sup>4</sup> about the financial crisis of 2007-2010 and the administrative policies of President Obama (Covey, 2011, P.08).

Politically, this school favors native ethnic or racial blood for gaining political authority over economic resources while, economically, it favors a mixed economic system in the respective area, locality, society, or state where an ethnic or racial group has to get political and economic control. Ethno-national movements for gaining regional autonomy or independence in the Post-Soviet Eurasian region or Iran can also be quoted as the best examples for this school. Therefore, we can say that the major philosophy of this school is moved around the definition of political economy based on ethno-national movements (Covey, 2011, PP.08-09; Cuperus, 2001, PP.115-116). According to Third Positionists, some major philosophical principles of this school are as follows;

<sup>3</sup> Now, it has been renamed by American Freedom Party.

<sup>4</sup> Right-wing populists combines anti-elitism and economic liberalism (laissez faire economics). They are also called anti-immigrant, neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, neoliberal, libertarian, new right, authoritarian, etc (Wodak, 2013, P.03).

- 1) The native ethnic or racial group should lead the domestic economics (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 2) State or local autonomist government under a major native ethnic or racial group should supervise all the economic activities under certain rules and regulations (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 3) There should be free trade under some sort of protectionist policies imposed by the state or local autonomist government (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 4) Each individual (whether belonging to any ethnic or racial group) in a state and each region of the state (without considering any demographic ratio) should have equal opportunities for economic development (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 5) State or local autonomist government should control over-charging, less measuring and low quality in basic necessities of life. There should also be state/local autonomist government-run enterprises for the official provision of general public goods (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 6) State or local autonomist government must discourage economic inequality between all the segments of society under its jurisdiction (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 7) State or local autonomist governments should get economic independence and self-sufficiency as legitimate objectives to pursue (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).
- 8) Private property is fully allowed without any ethnic or racial discrimination. The state has no right to intervene in private ownership until violation of any law (Echols, 2009, PP.07-10; Berdal, Accessed on September 09, 2016).

### **Iqbal's Concept of Nationalism**

This is generally recognized in Indo-Pak academia that Iqbal's initial concept of nationalism was based upon territorial-based nationalism which later shifted towards religion-based nationalism because of his spiritual inclinations. However, Third Positionists have quite opposite viewpoints in this regard. They argue that Iqbal was a modern Muslim scholar whose ideology had been affected a lot by European political norms and values. As he had been inspired by German culture and socio-political norms during his stay in Germany for doctoral studies at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, he deeply observed the basic traits of German-based ethnic nationalism and patriotism. As a result, his book "The Reconstruction of religious thoughts in Islam" highly reflected his newly constructed link between German-based concepts of ethnic nationalism/patriotism, and, the spiritual doctrine of Islam (sometimes called Sufism). Therefore, in the quest of defining the concepts of governance, nationality and political power, he emphasized the intense need of applying spiritual aspects of Islam. And, this was the first step of his conversion or shift from territorial-based nationalism to religion-based nationalism where he replaced different traits within German nationalism/patriotism (such as socio-cultural norms, language, genetics and race) with only Islam.

Iqbal publically exhibited this newly constructed concept in 1930 during his address to the annual session of the All India Muslim League (Sir Shafi Group) in Allahabad (United Province) which got popularity not only in British India but also in other countries. Famous Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati Mazinani was also inspired a lot by Iqbal's respective concept<sup>5</sup>, and he further built a linkage between German-based ethnic nationalism/patriotism and Iqbal's religion-based nationalism under the teachings of Twelver-Shia Islam. Therefore, numerous Iranians relate Iqbal and Ali Shariati in a way that 'if Iqbal is an ideological founder of Pakistan, Ali Shariati is the ideologue of Islamic Revolution 1979 in Iran.

Moreover, during Second Round Table Conference in September 1931 in London, Iqbal received an invitation from the Italian government where he came to know that Mussolini wants to meet him. Iqbal accepted this invitation and met the Italian dictator on November 27, 1931. This meeting, a big part of Asian or Eastern literature portrays the discussion between Iqbal and Mussolini regarding what should be administrative functions and features of government, especially in Italy. However, no one historian or researcher claims that the concepts of "racism" and "nationalism" were their topic of discussion. This is because Mussolini had no faith in "racism", he just desired to promote Italian heritage. On the other hand, Iqbal criticized his approach and advised him to look at Iranians who follow racism. He further told Mussolini that the Iranian nation is much stronger because of living in the region encircled by several other historically strong nations like Turks, Afghans, and Kurds. According to him, Italians would only become a strong nation when they will follow eastern norms that make the eastern historical nations still fresh, energetic and progressive. On a question about Iqbal's views on the Fascist movement, Iqbal replied to Mussolini that 'you have introduced a new dimension of discipline for your nation, but it would be very effective if you link it to spirituality' (Anjum, 2017).

Hence, to examine the shifting of Iqbal's conceptual framework from territorial-based nationalism to religion-based nationalism, Third Positionists reject the Asian or Eastern scholars' viewpoints regarding dogmatism or theocratic attitude within the personality of Iqbal, believing that he was following European (German and Italian) version of nationalism since the very first day. His varying ideology was not because of any religious aspirations but an 'Eastern' version of Nazism or Fascism. In defense of their view, they present certain arguments, such as;

- 1) Like socio-cultural, lingual and biological traits as identity features within the German nation, Iqbal gives the religious identity to the Muslims to British India, declaring them as a nation by the following religion as the sub-part of society and culture.
- 2) Like planned political and economic control over the resources by the authoritarian regimes of Hitler and Mussolini (in Germany and Italy respectively), Iqbal also hypothesized planned political and economic control over the resources (as per the teachings of Islam) by the one Muslim ruler (*caliph*) in Muslims majority areas within British India.

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<sup>5</sup> Ali Shariati and numerous other Iranian scholars were/are inspired from Iqbal not only from his academic, historical or literary researches but also because they assume Iqbal as the follower of Twelver-Shia Islam. And, the biggest reason of their assumption is actually a major portion of Iqbal's poetry that covers love to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his holy family (especially Imam Hussain).

- 3) Hitler and Mussolini defined the German and Italian nations in such a way that wherever in the world there are people who speak German or Italian, who practice German or Italian culture, who belong to the German or Italian race, they are all part of either the German or Italian nation. However, to maintain harmony, strong ties between them, and practice disciplined life as per their norms, there must be a strong sovereign state where the established government (of either Germans or Italians) has the responsibility to protect the rights of nationals not only living within the territorial jurisdiction of the state but also all over the world.

In the same way, Iqbal promoted Pan-Islamism or broader Muslim nationalism around the globe but felt a need of designing a disciplined life (as per the teachings of Islam) for the Muslim nation within British India under their populated territorial jurisdiction.

Thus, the Third Positionists count Iqbal's concept of nationalism as a product of an early phase of developing the Third Position school of thought. Similar to Nazism and Fascism, Iqbal's Pan-Islamism and the Ideology of Pakistan have also the same patterns, promoted by the Third Positionists. However, the problem is; Pakistan has become an independent state in 1947 under Iqbal's viewpoint, but his Third Positionist perspective is further triggering ethno-sectarian separatism in Pakistan, especially at the CPEC route in Gilgit-Baltistan. Because frequent allegations about the Ismaili community have declared them non-believers or non-Muslims from banned militant organizations like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, machinations about "Agha Khan State" have been circulating among patriotic Pakistanis. As the majority of the Ismaili community is lived in the Gilgit and Diamer divisions of Gilgit-Baltistan, this study examines the truth behind incessant machination for Agha Khan State, and, tries to investigate the relationship between the Ismaili-Deobandi conflicts and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

### **Machination for Agha Khan State in Gilgit-Baltistan**

Some scholars and analysts associate the machination for Agha Khan State in Gilgit-Baltistan with the ethno-national separatism in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan whereas; some Pakistani analysts count this movement as a result of ethno-sectarian dilemma in Pakistan. The majority of Ismaili-Shia Muslims live in the historical Badakhshan Region which is also called Pamir Mountain Range. Currently, this region consists of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan, Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan, Chitral District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Gilgit and Diamer divisions within the Gilgit-Baltistan Autonomous Region of Pakistan, and, Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County of Xinjiang in China. Three sorts of ethno-national movements have been recorded in the respective region during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as;

- 1) United Badakhshan Movement
- 2) Gorno-Badakhshan Independence Movement
- 3) Movement for Agha Khan State

The local government of Gorno-Badakhshan declared independence from Tajikistan in 1992 which triggered other two movements; United Badakhshan Movement and Agha Khan State Movement. However, after five years of civil war between the Tajik military and the Ismaili-Pamiri community of Gorno-Badakhshan, the local government of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region called back its announcement for independence in 1997. The end of this war also discouraged United Badakhshan

Movement. Though, some analysts still observe the seeds of ethno-national separatism in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan on the bases of either Pamiri ethnic nationalism or the Ismaili School of Shia Islam.

Third Positionists consider that both identities are also greatly affecting Pamiri ethnic community or Ismaili-Shia Muslims in Gilgit-Baltistan. Because of declaring Ismaili-Shia Muslims as non-Muslims from banned militant organizations, Third Positionists believe that the Ismaili community would force to follow Iqbal's concept of religion-based nationalism. Although the local government of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan or Afghan political parties in Badakhshan Province never highlighted their ambitions for establishing a religion-based Agha Khan State, various Sunni-Deobandi religious leaders in Pakistan hypothesize that all developmental agencies under Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) are indirectly or silently working for paving the way for establishing an independent Agha Khan State in the entire Badakhshan region or especially in Gilgit-Baltistan. However, the majority of the population in Pakistan despite their sectarian differences considers Ismaili Muslims as peace-loving and progressive. Similarly, the Government of Pakistan has also confirmed that the machinations for Agha Khan State are not more than conspiracies. This is because; contemporary statistical assessments show that the majority of Ismaili families have converted their sectarian faiths in Gilgit-Baltistan. Now, just 5% of Wakhi-speaking, 6% Khowar-speaking, and 22% Burushaski-speaking people of the total Pamiri population in Gilgit-Baltistan are following the Ismaili sect of Shia-Islam. Therefore, any expected revival of the independence movement in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan would not widely affect Pamiri ethnic population in Northern parts of Pakistan (Poor, 2014, PP.169-172; Mastibekov, May 16, 2014, P.20; Brown, 2008, P.312).

On the other hand, the Ismaili community in Gilgit-Baltistan rejects the demographic claim described above. According to them, the sectarian demography of Gilgit-Baltistan is recorded as;

<b>Sectarian Demography of Gilgit-Baltistan</b>				
<b>Districts</b>	<b>Sunni (Deobandi)</b>	<b>Twelver-Shia</b>	<b>Ismaili</b>	<b>Noorbakhshi</b>
<b>Gilgit</b>	19%	54%	27%	0
<b>Hunza-Nagar</b>	01%	20%	79%	0
<b>Ghizar</b>	13%	0	87%	0
<b>Astor</b>	70%	30%	0	0
<b>Ganche</b>	08%	05%	0	87%
<b>Skardu</b>	02%	87%	01%	10%
<b>Diامر</b>	95%	05%	0	0

(Hamdan, 2017)

This table shows that the sectarian demography in Gilgit-Baltistan comprises the 27% Sunni-Deobandi, 28% Twelver-Shia, 27% Ismaili and 13% Noorbakhshi population whereas; the remaining 5% belongs to either Sunni-Brelvi Islam, Ahl-e-Hadith Islam or Buddhist religion. Because of the almost equal population ratio of the three major sects, political scientists predict that Gilgit-Baltistan is going towards intense ethno-sectarian conflicts either among 'Shia and Sunni-Deobandi communities or between 'Ismaili and Sunni-Deobandi communities soon. Historically, tension among Sunni-Deobandi and Shia groups started during the Zia regime when hundreds of Shias and Sunni-Deobandis were killed by each other under riots

in 1983 and 1988. Similarly, the planned murder of more than sixty people at Karakorum highway near Chillas happened when some Sunni-Deobandi militants stopped public transport and killed Shia people belonging to Gilgit city and its surroundings. Since then, Chillas has been added to the list of the most sensitive area suffering from conflictual ethno-sectarian ideology, and a military convoy protects public transport crossing this area. (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015; Hunzai, Accessed on January 19, 2017). On the other hand, more than 55 killings of Ismaili people in Safura Gate Karachi were an effort to create disturbance and distances between Ismaili and Sunni-Deobandi communities not only in Karachi but in Gilgit-Baltistan too. However, the masses at large realize(d) such killings as terrorism for deteriorating or fading socio-economic development under Pak-China Economic Corridor (Abideen, 2016, P.02).

Moreover, the sensitive nature of ethno-sectarian dilemma in Chillas also coerces this study to judge that the majority of the respective district follows the Sunni-Deobandi school of thought, having additional "jihadi". Thus, a vital segment among them assumes followers of all the other sects (like Shia, Noorbakshi Sofia, Noorbakshi Imamia or Ismaili) as non-Muslims. In this situation, ethno-sectarian conflict(s) can be intensified more if the government does not take any necessary action. By looking at distinct reports on this issue, the study also traces the suggestions about strengthening the governance along with providing equal socio-economic opportunities to the entire population regarding overcoming ethno-sectarian differences, especially in the Chillas district. Otherwise, anyone who suffered elements within the diverse society of Gilgit-Baltistan can rethink its future affiliations (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015).

Throughout Pervez Musharraf, when the government initiated many efforts to remove socio-religious extremism and militancy from Pakistan, the Ismaili community felt pure satisfaction and complete accommodation within the state. However, this satisfaction was not long-lasting. On January 08, 2015, the murder of Ismaili leader; Zia-ud-Din caused riots in Gilgit-Baltistan which lasted till the imposition of curfew in the cities of Gilgit and Skardu (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015). At least 15 people died in respective riots. After some days, two more Ismaili social workers of AKDN were killed by the two militants of the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Chitral. This time, investigations of respective murders exhibited the issue of foreign funding against the Ismaili community at the CPEC route. Another shocking fact was exposed while interrogations that both militants admitted to receiving aid from Saudi Arabia through the students' wing of Jamat-e-Islami; called Islami Jamiat Talba (IJT). Similarly, another report exposed some retired soldiers who were once temporary recruited by Pakistan Army for participating in Afghan Jihad, are now involved in the promotion of dogmatism, extremism and militarism in the state, also involve in hateful activities against the Ismaili community in Gilgit-Baltistan (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015).

For deflating these factors, Musharraf initiated another step to remove all the material from the educational curriculum that can be a cause of boosting sectarian differences or generating militant attitudes. However, he faced violent opposition triggered by Jamat-e-Islami from the platform of Mutahida majlis-e-Amal when he decided to take assistance from the Agha Khan Educational Board in this regard (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015). Qazi Hussain Ahmed (late); head of Jamat-e-Islami at that time blamed Musharraf wants to make a secular Pakistan with the help of the Agha Khan Educational Board. However, government officials not only denied any effort regarding installing secularization but also showed intentions to regulate curriculum in Madrasas that were once designed with the help of the

US and Saudi funding during Afghan Jihad but remained fixed even after the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan. The prime motive of the government for seeking assistance from the Agha Khan Educational Board regarding this is; the current 49<sup>th</sup> Imam of the Ismaili community; Prince Karim Agha Khan has schooling from Harvard, considers noble in the European community. And, this is the reason that USAID provides huge funding to Agha Khan Educational Board regarding promoting anti-dogmatic attitude, inter-faith harmony, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in the entire Pakistan including Gilgit-Baltistan (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015).

Facts show that Musharraf also desired to experience a similar educational system in the whole Pakistan for eliminating ethno-sectarian differences. But, unfortunately, major rightist political parties including key sectarian groups opposed his desire and propagated this effort as an initial step towards establishing Agha Khan State. On December 03, 2004, an association of Sunni-Brelvi teachers; Tanzeem-e-Asatza warned Musharraf Government against the affiliation of public sector schools and colleges to the Agha Khan Educational Board and threatened to conduct an anti-government march towards Islamabad. At the same time, Islami Jamiat Talba (IJT) also opposed Musharraf's plan to start O'level and A'level (by replacing matric and intermediate educational system in the entire country) with the help of the Agha Khan Educational Board for competing for international standards at secondary and higher secondary levels (Maitra, Accessed on April 10, 2015).

Although, the Musharraf regime was internationally recognized as very cooperative for all the major ethnic minorities including the Ismaili community. His government also launched several developmental projects in Gilgit-Baltistan including Kashgar-Gwadar Road Reconstruction Plan 2004 (later renamed CPEC in 2013). However, sponsored insurgency against the Ismaili community led the sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan. Although, it has been proved since the imprisonment of Indian spy Kalbhushan Jadhav that India had been involved in triggering ethno-sectarian conflicts and anti-CPEC activities in Pakistan by using Afghan soil, whatever the reason will be; a suffering community would be moved towards raising slogans of independence when it could not feel safe in any country. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan should realize that peace, progress and prosperity must be ensured at the CPEC route. Otherwise, Iqbal's concept of nationalism can be revised in favor of any other ethno-lingual, ethno-geographical, or ethno-sectarian community in Gilgit-Baltistan. Whether there will not be slogans favoring the "United Badakhshan Movement", they can be related to separate Agha Khan State (on the bases of Ismaili Islam) or sovereign Gilgit-Baltistan (on the bases of geography as it has also been registered in UNPO). In both circumstances, the Kashgar-Gilgit-Gwadar branch of the historical Silk Road as CPEC would be easily cartelized or collapsed. Therefore, Third Positionists within Pakistan demand fruitful constitutional and political accommodations for all the ethnic communities including Ismaili Muslims that would stop the revision of Iqbal's concept of nationalism by promoting pragmatism and patriotism within the existing state structure (GB-Bulletin, Accessed on January 19, 2017).

## Conclusion

History of Pakistan since the Pakistan Movement defends the Ismaili Muslims as not only the major participants in the struggle for a separate homeland of British Indian Muslims but also as the foremost contributors in the socio-political and economic development of Pakistan. The First President of the All India Muslim League; Sir Agha Khan was also the 48<sup>th</sup> Imam of Ismaili Muslims. Similarly, different projects

under Agha Khan Development Network are efficiently working in Pakistan without any biasedness or sectarian differences that show their commitment to the development of Pakistan. However, some banned militant organizations and their followers' attitudes towards Ismaili Muslims not only disturb AKDN's true commitment to promoting anti-dogmatic attitude, inter-faith harmony, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism in Pakistan. Therefore, any expected series of violence between Sunni-Deobandi and Ismaili Muslims can coerce the Ismaili community to think about following Third Positionists' School at which they once had played a vital role in establishing a separate homeland for British Indian Muslims. Efforts for snatching Muslim identity from them would become a cause of emerging ethno-sectarian separatism in Ismaili-populated areas which further can gain strength from 'Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region' or 'Afghan Province of Badakhshan' that would disturb the law and order situation in the Gilgit-Baltistan. Moreover, any expected Deobandi-Ismaili conflict would also collapse the CPEC Project as an economic backbone of Pakistan during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Therefore, it has become essential not only in Gilgit-Baltistan but entire Pakistan to promote an anti-dogmatic attitude, inter-faith harmony, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism at an official level. So, each ethnic community (by having constitutional and political accommodation under the concept of Third Positionism or Modern Tribalism) would experience pragmatism and patriotism within the existing state structure.

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